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E veryone agrees that autonomous cars ought to save lives. Evenif the cars do not live up to the most optimistic estimates ofeliminating 90% of traffic fatalities [1], eliminating at least sometraffic fatalities is one of the key promises of automated driving.
Indeed, the first two principles of the German Ethics Code for Automated and
Connected Vehicles lead with this goal as a normative imperative [2].
The primary purpose of partly and fully automated transport systems is to improve safety
for all road users. The licensing of automated systems is not justifiable unless it promises
to produce at least a diminution in harm compared with human driving [. . . ].
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This view amounts to
considering autonomous cars as
implicit ethical agents, in Moor’s
terminology [3]. Machines are
implicit ethical agents when
their actions impact ethical
issues (such as safety) and when
these actions are constrained
to avoiding unethical outcomes
(such as casualties). Unlike
explicit ethical agents, implicit
ones do not learn or encode
ethics explicitly—and thus, they
cannot autonomously arbitrate
between different kinds of harm.
For example, autonomous cars
as implicit ethical agents strive
to avoid crashes—but when
a crash is unavoidable, when
all trajectories are likely to
end up in casualties, implicit
ethical agents find themselves
dumbfounded, and unable to
choose among the different
ethical choices.
I. S E L F-D R I V I N G
T R O L L E Y P R O B L E M
I S L U D I C R O U S
Such edge cases have drawn
so much attention that they
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threaten to cannibalize the whole
field of autonomous car ethics. Almost
every discussion of autonomous car
ethics features some version of the
so-called trolley dilemma [4], for
example:
An autonomous car is barreling down
on five persons, and cannot stop in
time to save them. The only way to
save them is to swerve and crash into
an obstacle, but the passenger of the
car would then die. What should the
car do?
This kind of highly stylized, black-
and-white thought experiment is
useful as a tool for raising public
awareness of complex ethical issues.
It is also useful for assessing
people’s moral intuitions without
burdening them with an intricate
mechanical description of just how
such an improbable situation might
arise [5], [6]. But the downside
of using such stylized scenarios is
that their fanciful nature and lack
of realism strains the credulity of
engineers, making it hard for them to
care. Why is the car cruising at such
unsafe speed? Why can’t it just brake
hard? Why is it constrained to just two
trajectories? How do we know for sure
that the passenger is going to die? In
sum, why should we care about such
vague, unrealistic, improbable use
cases, when our time is best spent
trying to avoid them in the first place?
These are legitimate questions. From
an engineering perspective, situations
in which autonomous cars would act
as explicit ethical agents (making
life and death decisions based on
encoded ethics) seem too thorny and
far-fetched to be a priority. It is far
easier to treat autonomous cars as
implicit ethical agents, whose actions
are systematically oriented toward
minimizing the absolute risk of a
crash.
II. S TAT I S T I C A L T R O L L E Y
D I L E M M A
Alas, ignoring the challenges of
autonomous vehicles as explicit eth-
ical agents will only postpone the
problem. Even if every action of an
autonomous car is oriented toward
minimizing the absolute risk of a
crash, each action will also shift rel-
ative risk from one road user to
another [7], [8]. The cars may not
be making decisions between outright
sacrificing the lives of some to pre-
serve those of others, but they will
be making decisions about who is
put at marginally more risk of being
sacrificed.
For example, consider the illustra-
tion in Fig. 1. An autonomous car may
position itself away from a large truck,
and closer to a cyclist—marginally
decreasing the absolute risk of a crash,
and yet marginally increasing the rel-
ative risk incurred by the cyclist. Or
it could position itself away from the
bicycle, and closer to the other line
of the road—marginally decreasing
the absolute risk to the cyclist, and
yet marginally increasing the relative
risks incurred by its own passengers.
These are not the dramatic, life and
death decisions featured in trolley
dilemmas. But once they are aggre-
gated over millions of cars driving bil-
lions of miles, these small statistical
decisions add up to life and death
consequences—and prompt the same
questions as the trolley dilemma did.
In expectation, the trolley dilemma
and the statistical trolley dilemma are
equivalent.
Consider the 10 000 fatalities
caused by car crashes in 2015 in
urban areas of the European Union.
Of these, about 61% were car
passengers (drivers included), and
39% were pedestrians.1 In other
words, about three passengers died
for two pedestrians. Imagine now,
for the sake of argument, that the
2018 statistics would show a reversal
to one passenger fatality for five
pedestrian fatalities. Such a shift
in relative risk would likely prompt
serious investigations. Much research
would be conducted to identify the
cause of the shift, to assess whether
it constituted an unfair development
for the safety of pedestrians, and to
decide which regulation would be
required to correct this unfairness.
In essence, we would circle back
to the trolley dilemma, only in a
statistical format. Instead of asking
whether one passenger should die to
save five pedestrians in a given crash,
we would ask whether one passenger
should die for five pedestrians, across
all the crashes recorded in a single
year.
III. B I G S H I N Y B U L L B A R
V E R S U S B L A C K B O X
A L G O R I T H M
As a matter of fact, we have been
there before. In 1996, a report from
the U.K. Transportation Research Lab-
oratory investigated the impact of
“bull bars” on pedestrian risk [9].
Bull bars are hard metal protec-
tions fitted to the front of four-
wheel vehicles, which were originally
used for off-road trips in wild areas.
Their usefulness in urban environ-
ment was questionable, though, and
they seemed especially dangerous to
pedestrians since, compared to a tra-
ditional bumper, the bars’ smaller
and more rigid surface area con-
centrated and intensified the impact
on a struck victim. The report esti-
mated that, in the year 1994, bull
bars were responsible for two or three
additional pedestrian fatalities in the
United Kingdom. This is a very small
shift—indeed, it is about the smallest
shift one could imagine. Nevertheless,
it led to a long series of tests and reg-
ulations which culminated in a global
bull bar ban in the European Union.
What the bull bar story tells us is
that physical features of the car can
shift the relative risks incurred by dif-
ferent road users, that such a shift can
be recognized as an ethical tradeoff,
and that some instantiations of this
tradeoff can be deemed as unaccept-
able. Now, a bull bar is a big shiny
object in front of the car, which is
easy to notice, easily understood as
dangerous, and easily removed. The
programming of autonomous cars,
in contrast, is hidden deep under the
hood. The cumulative effect of many
small automated decisions, meant to
minimize the absolute risk of a crash,
1ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/specialist/statistics
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Fig. 1. Statistical trolley dilemma: a large truck appears in the lane next to a car with
five passengers. The car must choose whether to stay put (top) or move slightly left
(bottom). Aggregated over thousands of cars and millions of miles, small shifts in
positioning can shift the relative risks incurred by different categories of road
users (e.g., cyclists versus passengers).
will plausibly lead to shifts in the rel-
ative risks incurred by different road
users—but this cumulated effect is
neither easily predictable nor easily
fixable. In all likelihood, we will only
learn about it after the fact, once
aggregated statistics are available for
all to see, assuming these statistics are
up for scrutiny by independent third
parties. And the question is, will we
like what we see?
The problem is that we currently
have no idea where to set the cur-
sor. It is straightforward that we want
autonomous cars to lead to fewer
fatalities—but we do not know how
these fatalities ought to be distrib-
uted among road users. We could,
of course, opt for the status quo,
and consider that relative risks ought
to stay the same as what they are
now. But there are no ethical grounds
for such a choice. Current ratios of
passenger to pedestrian fatalities do
not result from reasoned and carefully
calculated ethical forethought, but
from an accumulation of split-second
decisions and unexamined behaviors.
The opportunity to program these
decisions in advance means that we
can (and thus should) make deliber-
ate choices, but we currently have no
consensus about what those choices
should be.
IV. W H Y T H E D I L E M M A S
M AT T E R
The issue is so thorny that we might
be tempted to avoid it entirely, and
to consider that, well, anything goes.
Let us stick to minimizing fatalities,
without concerning ourselves with the
distribution of these fatalities. But
consider then the effect of market
forces and consumer preferences. Say
two competing companies market
self-driving cars that both eliminate
80% of fatalities, but one com-
pany’s cars split the remaining fatal-
ities equally between passengers and
pedestrians, whereas the other com-
pany’s cars split the remaining fatali-
ties nine-to-one in favor of their pas-
sengers. Consumers would flock to
the cars of the second company [5],
and pedestrian risks would gradually
inflate to unacceptably unfair levels.
Ultimately, we will need to decide,
as a society, what we consider to
be a fair distribution of risks among
road users. This is not an easy deci-
sion. Too much favor toward passen-
gers over pedestrians could produce
public outrage toward self-driving car
companies and passengers. Too much
favor toward pedestrians and poten-
tial autonomous car consumers may
vote with their wallets and opt-out of
yielding their autonomy to machines
that do not make their owners’ inter-
ests sufficiently paramount. Either
scenario could derail the rollout of
autonomous vehicles and delay the
benefits they promise to bring. Right
now, this conversation has relied
heavily on trolley dilemmas, whose
lack of realism has tempted many to
discard the conversation as techni-
cally irrelevant. This reaction is both
legitimate and mistaken. It is legit-
imate because trolley dilemmas do
lack realism. It is mistaken because
trolley dilemmas are merely the unre-
alistic discrete version of a very real
dilemma that emerges at a statistical
level. This statistical dilemma needs to
be solved, and engineers must have a
voice in this process.
R E F E R E N C E S
[1] M. Bertoncello and D. Wee, “Ten ways autonomous
driving could redefine the automotive world,” Inst.
McKinsey Company, Tech. Rep.,
2015.
[2] C. Luetge, “The German ethics code for automated
and connected driving,” J. Philosophy Technol.,
vol. 30, pp. 547–558, Dec. 2017.
[3] J. H. Moor, “The nature, importance, and difficulty
of machine ethics,” IEEE Intell. Syst., vol. 21, no. 4,
pp. 18–21, Jul. 2006.
[4] P. Foot, “The problem of abortion and the doctrine
of double effect,” J. Oxford Rev., vol. 5, pp. 5–15,
1967.
[5] J. F. Bonnefon, A. Shariff, and I. Rahwan, “The
social dilemma of autonomous vehicles,” J. Sci.,
vol. 352, pp. 1573–1576, Jun. 2016.
[6] A. Shariff, J.-F. Bonnefon, and I. Rahwan,
“Psychological roadblocks to the adoption of
self-driving vehicles,” J. Nature Hum. Behav., vol. 1,
pp. 694–696, Sep. 2017.
[7] N. J. Goodall, “Ethical decision making during
automated vehicle crashes,” Transp. Res. Rec., J.
Transp. Res. Board, vol. 2424, no. 1, pp. 58–65,
2014.
[8] N. J. Goodall, “Away from trolley problems and
toward risk management,” Appl. Artif. Intell.,
vol. 30, no. 8, pp. 810–821, 2016.
[9] B. J. Hardy, “A study of accidents involving bull bar
equipped vehicles,” Transp. Res. Lab., Tech. Rep.
2431996, 1996.
504 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE | Vol. 107, No. 3, March 2019
